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Abstract 
Confronted with the increasingly severe information 
security problems, proper configuration of security 
technologies is critical to enhance the information 
systems performance. To solve the integrated linkage 
control problem based on attack detection, the 
security model including firewall, intrusion detection 
system (IDS) and vulnerability scan is analyzed by 
game theory. The analyses show that more IT 
portfolio will not bring better benefits, and more 
fixed vulnerabilities are not the better choice for the 
firm either. However, reasonable configuration of 
firewall will always reduce the firm’s expected loss. 
According to the Nash equilibrium of the model, 
technical parameters are configured to minimize the 
firm’s expected loss. 
Key words: economics of information systems; 
firewall; IDS; vulnerability scan; security portfolio 
strategy  
1 Introduction 
With the rapid development of microelectronics and 
emergence of information industry, the tide of 
informatization is billowy. An important feature of 
information age is accessing to information and 
exchanging information by network [1], e-commerce 
has developed rapidly, and online transaction of 
enterprises has carried on actively [2]. But science and 
technology is two sides sword. When the whole 
society popularizes information technology, the 
diversification trends of information systems security 
problems are getting evident: hackers spread, privacy 
issues, computer network crime, confidence crisis, 
variety purposes of system invasion, etc., especially 
the increasingly severe e-commerce security 
problems. In view of rigorous information security 
trend, all kinds of IT security measures were 
successively found. Mainstream security 
technologies include firewall, IDS and vulnerability 
scan, etc. [3]. Nevertheless each IT has its own 
advantages and limitations, and only the proper 
configuration of IT can achieve the information 
system dynamic security, which is the key to balance 
the information protection and information access as 
well. 
Different information system security problems can 
be solved by different IT portfolios. In general, 
according to the different security threats and 
protection focuses, information system security 
should generate the following five strategies: the 
integrated linkage control problem based on attack 
detection; the border security control problem based 
on active defense; the unified access management 
problem based on source control; the integrated 
threat management problem based on security fusion; 
the closed-loop strategy management problem based 
on asset protection. Our findings offer solutions to 
the integrated linkage control problem based on 
attack detection, it mainly needs to deploy 
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vulnerability scan, intrusion detection, firewall, etc., 
and to achieve a linkage control between firewall, 
IDS, routers and switches. In this problem, all the 
security threats are reflected in the attacker's 
malicious behavior. The attacks are effectively 
recognized by detecting their behavior characteristics. 
As a result, the linkage between security equipment 
and network equipment executes an effective control 
to prevent the attacks.  
At present, there are two significant trends to address 
the information system security. One transition is 
from the traditional IT security to the integration of 
IT and security management; the other transition is 
from the traditional use of a single IT to the use of IT 
portfolios. The traditional information security 
technology methods are mainly studied in a purely 
technical aspect, whose research has focused on the 
design of algorithms related to firewalls, IDS and 
others, such as encryption. For example, various 
approaches to firewall design are discussed in 
Holden and Gouda and Liu [4], [5]. The algorithms 
used in anomaly-based IDS are presented in 
Neumann and Porras, and Zamboni and Spafford [6], 
[7]. The other methods are studied in an economics 
and management aspect to study on the IT 
configuration and strategy formulation, which 
integrate IT and security management. Therefore, in 
the last few years, a new research filed has arisen in 
information management system—Economics of 
Information Security. Gal-Or and Ghose have 
analyzed the relationship between the security 
technology investments and information sharing by 
game theory, and show that the higher substitutability 
among the enterprises product, the more valuable the 
security information sharing, i.e. the more intense 
competition industry will benefit more when it 
establishes the sharing alliances[8]. Lye and Wing 
have established a random game model, which 
obtains the Nash equilibrium and the best strategy 
selection between the managers and the attackers [9]. 
Hu, Hart and Cooke have analyzed the role of 
external and internal influences on information 
systems security in a neo-institutional perspective [10]. 
There are more abundant achievements on the 
traditional use of a single IT. For instance, Li etc. 
have analyzed the intrusion prevention system 
management and configuration by inspection game 
theory [11].Alpcan has established the model of 
nonzero-sum and non-cooperative dynamic game 
between two players [12]. Cavusoglu and Raghunathan 
have respectively analyzed the IDS configuration 
based on decision theory and game theory, when it 
defends the attacks [13]. However, there is little 
research on the use of IT portfolios. Piessens has 
proposed that if the IT selection and portfolios are 
used inappropriately, the hackers may attack 
successfully by the weakness in the installation of 
software, which means the more use of IT may not 
be able to improve the security [14]. Zhu and 
Raghunathan have proposed the evaluation model of 
information security technologies on game theory, 
which include firewall, intrusion diction system and 
intrusion tolerant [15]. Cavusoglu etc. have studied 
configuration of and interaction between a firewall 
and IDS, and show that deploying a technology, 
whether it is the firewall or the IDS, could hurt the 
firm if the configuration is not optimized for the 
firm’s environment [16].  
Thus for the information security problems are very 
important, there are a large number of relevant 
domestic and international achievements in the recent 
years, although the economics of information 
security is a new field. But most of the achievements 
are based on one security IT, and there are few on the 
security IT portfolios, especially on more than three 
IT portfolios. The development of information 
network is a game process between information 
protection technology and information attack 
technology. In this game, we assume that the player 
using information protection technology is the firm, 
and the other player using information attack 
technology is the hacker, then the game transfers into 
the game between the firm and the hacker. The 
objective of the firm is to minimize its expected loss 
from intrusions; on the other hand, the hacker is to 
maximize his expected benefit. If the game is to 
achieve the balance, a reasonable strategy and proper 
technical parameter configuration will be the key 
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factors. In this paper, the security model including 
firewall, intrusion detection system (IDS) and 
vulnerability scan has been analyzed by game theory, 
and the problem of IT selection and optimal 
configuration has been studied. Moreover, the game 
strategy has been analyzed, and the impact on the 
access control policy for the firm has been proposed 
subsequently. In the end, it concludes the paper with 
a discussion of the implications of our results and 
future research directions. 
2 Information Security Model 
In a protected system, the protective measures are 
usually deployed to defense the security incidents by 
the system security policy [17]. For sake of analysis, 
an information security model is introduced here 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Information Security Model 
Although each IT security has different objectives, 
they are not independent of each other in control. 
Firewall can generally prevent intrusion, IDS can 
detect intrusion, and vulnerability scan can identify 
the security risks and the vulnerabilities exploited by 
hackers. In practice, according to the network 
topology, applications and safety requirements, we 
deploy the proper firewall; monitor the key points of 
the network in real-time by IDS, adjust the system 
automatically by the system administrator or security 
strategy after discovering the intrusion; scan the 
system at regular intervals to find the vulnerabilities 
of configuration changes and fix them in time. 
Generally there are four reasonable technology 
portfolios: only deploy firewall and IDS; only deploy 
IDS and vulnerability scan; deploy all the 
technologies; deploy none of the technologies. 
Therein, the principle of firewall and IDS portfolio is 
that, IDS is able to detect the intrusion outside the 
firewall, and firewall is able to further adjust the 
security strategy by the feedback information of IDS, 
which can prevent the intrusion behavior from the 
beginning, and that can greatly improve the entire 
defense system performance. In addition, the 
principle of IDS and vulnerability scan portfolio is 
that, IDS acquires the anomaly cases of attacks, 
whereas scanner acquires the security risks of the 
objective system. The exist vulnerabilities in the 
system is able to be derived reversely by the attack 
information from IDS; on the other side, the system 
risks are able to effectively connect with the attack 
states to estimate and forecast the trend of attacks. 
Cavusoglu etc. [10] have discussed the portfolio: only 
deploy firewall and IDS; and deploy none of the 
technologies, which have researched on the 
configuration of and interaction between firewall and 
IDS. The result is that default setting usually brings 
the risk, and the vulnerabilities of software could be 
easy found by the hacker in this case. When firewall 
and IDS are in the same security system, only the 
proper configuration can benefit the firm from both 
the security and economy. Based on paper [10], our 
study focuses on the portfolio: only deploy IDS and 
vulnerability scan; and deploy all the technologies. 
3 Model Analyses 
We consider two types of users, the internal users and 
external users. Internal users have access to the 
system from inside the firewall, i.e. they do not go 
through the firewall; external users access the system 
from outside the firewall, and hence are validated by 
the firewall. No matter the portfolio (ⅰ) only deploy 
IDS and vulnerability scan, or the portfolio (ⅱ) 
deploy all the technologies, all users have to go 
through the scanner at regular intervals. However, the 
principle of the scanner is regularly testing the 
network risks, not as the same effect as firewall and 
IDS which can defense or prevent the invasion. So 
the effect of scanner is ahead of risk control 
initiatively for the firm, but for the hacker, it has 
raised the potential cost of invasion. We discuss the 
three broad components of our model—hacker, firm, 
Monitor external Monitor internal 
 
Monitor real-time 
Internal access 
Internal users  
 
A protected system 
Circular 
scanning 
External access 
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Vulnerability  
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and technology, and define the parameters as follows. 
（Ⅰ） Hacker 
(1) A hacker committing the intrusion 
derives a benefit of   if the intrusion in 
undetected. 
(2) If the intrusion is detected, the hacker 
incurs a penalty of   for a net benefit of - （ ）. 
We assume that   ; that is, a hacker that is 
detected does not enjoy a positive utility. 
(3) Denote the probability that a user 
hacks by  ( [0,1]  ). 
（Ⅱ） Firm 
(1) The firm incurs a cost of c  each time it 
performs a manual investigation. 
(2)  When an intrusion is undetected, the firm 
incurs a damage of d . 
(3)  If the firm detects an intrusion, the firm 
prevents or recovers a fraction, ( 1)   of d . It is 
reasonable to assume that c d , so that the firm’s 
cost of investigation is not higher than the benefit it 
gets if it detects an intrusion. 
（Ⅲ）Technology 
(1) Probability of firewall detection    
) , i.e. firewall 
stops an illegal external user. Probability of firewall 
false negative is1 F
(FDP P classify as a hacker∣user is a hacker
DP , i.e. firewall does not stop an 
illegal external user. Probability of firewall false 
positive ) , 
i.e. firewall stops a legal external user. 
(FFP P classify as a hacker∣user is a normal user
(2) Similarly, define probability of IDS 
detection IDP , i.e. 
I
DP  is the probability that the 
IDS raises an alarm for an intrusion. Probability of 
IDS false negative is ID1 P  i.e. ID1 P  is the 
probability that the IDS does not raise an alarm for 
an intrusion. Probability of IDS false positive IFP  i.e. 
I
FP  is the probability that the IDS raises an alarm 
when there is no intrusion. 
(3) The configuration cost of vulnerability scan 
is Sc ; the firm performs a manual investigation when 
detects the intrusion, the potential benefit of scanner 
for the firm is Sd ( 1)S  , the potential cost of 
scanner for the hacker is S . 
The objective of the firm is to minimize its expected 
loss from intrusions; on the other hand, the hacker is 
to maximize his expected benefit. We perform the 
analysis using backward induction. That is, we first 
derive the equilibrium for the firm’s investigation 
strategy and a user’s hacking strategy given the 
firm’s implementation and configuration strategies, 
then figure out the equilibrium point. Subsequently, 
we determine the firm’s optimal implementation and 
configuration strategy. Consequently, we derive the 
equilibrium strategies. In the following paragraphs, 
we separately analyze the portfolio (ⅰ) only deploy 
IDS and vulnerability scan, and the portfolio (ⅱ) 
deploy all the technologies. 
Portfolio (ⅰ): only deploy IDS and vulnerability 
scan 
Assume a user’s strategy SU∈｛H,NH｝, in which H 
is to hack, NH is not to hack.; the firm’s strategy 
SF∈｛（I,I）（I,NI）,(NI,I),(NI,NI)｝, in which I is to 
investigate, NI is not to investigate, and the first 
element in each ordered pair is the firm’s action 
when IDS raises an alarm, while the second element 
is the firm’s action when IDS does not raise an alarm. 
Let 1  and 2  respectively denote the firm’s 
investigation probabilities when the IDS raises an 
alarm and when the IDS does not raise an alarm, in 
which 1 [0,1] （ ） , and 2 [0,1] （ ） . In 
general, 2 1  . The following probability 
computations are used in deriving the equilibrium. 
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1= |alarm = + 1-
I
D
I I
D F
PP
P P
  （intrusion ） （ ）     （1） 
2
(1 )= | =
(1 ) +(1- 1-
I
D
I I
D F
PP
P P
  

（intrusion no-alarm） )( ）
 （2） 
( )= (1 ) ( )I I I I ID F F DP P P P P      alarm FP
)IFP
(1 )
 （3） 
( )=1 (I IF DP P P  no-alarm      （4） 
1 2( )=
I I
D DP P  hacker is detected P
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1A S S
 （5） 
The firm’s expected cost for the alarm and the 
no-alarm  states respectively are:  
AF
NF
( , ) (1 ) (1 )F c d d c d                  （6） 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ) (1 ) (1 )NF c d d cS Sd                 （7） 
Then the firm’s overall expected cost is:  
1 2
1
( , , )
( ( )) ( , ) (1 ( )) ( ,I I I I I IF D F A F D F N
F
P P P F P P P F
  
2 )     

     
  （8） 
The hacker’s expected benefit is:  
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( )( (1 ))
I
S D D
IH P            P    （9） 
Proposition 1: The following mixed strategy profiles 
constitute the Nash equilibrium for the IDS and 
vulnerability scan. 
If I
D
S
P  
, 
then
* * *
1 2
( ) (1 )(( 1, ), )
(1 )( ) ( )(1 )
I I
S D F
I I I I
D S S D F
P c P
DP d P cP
       
         cP ; 
If I
D
S
P  
, 
then
* * *
1 2(( , 0), )( ) ( )
I
F
I I I
S D D S F D
cP
IP P d cP c
         P  . 
Proof: The first derivatives of (6), (7) and (9) are: 
1 2( )( (1
I
S D D
H ))IP P    
           （10） 
1 1
1
(1 )A S
F c d   
     
2 2
2
(1 )N S
F c d    d
              （12） 
We can verify that,  
1 2
0, 0NA FF 
     cannot be 
satisfied simultaneously, and
1 2
NA FF
 
   . 
Consequently, in the equilibrium, 
1 2
0, 0,NA FF 
     or 1 2
0, 0NA FF 
    . 
Therefore we have two possible equilibrium 
scenarios: 1 21,0 1     and 1 20 1, 0    . 
When 1 21,0 1    ,  
In this scenario, (10) and (12) must equal to zero, and 
(11)>0.Sloving (10) and (12) for 2  and   
respectively, we get 
*
2
( )
(1 )( )
I
S D
I
D S
P
P
    
   
,                     (13)  
* (1 )
( )(1 )
I
F
I I I
S D F
c P
d P cP DcP
  
    
,            (14)  
2(13) 0 1
I
D
S
P         is substituted into ，
  When I
D
 P
S  
 is: 
, the strategy profiles of 
Nash equilibrium
* * *
1 2((
( ) (1 )1, ), )
(1 )( ) ( )(1 )
I I
S D F
I I I
D S S D F
P c P
P d P cP
  
  
   

  
     
， ）， ）
（（ I
DcP
0
. 
Similarly, 1 20 1,     
When I
D
S
P    ,the strategy profiles of Nash 
equilibrium is: 
* * *
1 2((
, 0 ), )
( ) ( )
I
F
I I I
S D D S F D
cP
IP P d cP cP
  

   

   
， ） ， ）
（ （
.   
d         （11） Conclusion 1: when I
D
S
P   , the profitable 
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probability of hack invasion is higher than the 
detected probability of hack invasion. That means the 
portfolio of only deploy IDS and scanner cannot 
benefit the firm, but hurt the firm. One of the reasons 
is that, the manual investigation will be conducted as 
soon as IDS has raised an alarm, which is very 
expensive and inefficient. The other reason is that, 
hacker prefers to intrude system in this case. Assume 
the probability of neutral for hacker’s intruding is 0.5, 
then in this case, the probability that a user hacks 
* 0.5,   we have ( )Sc d 0    , i.e. 
(c d )S  , which means the investigation cost 
is higher than the firm’s benefit, so it cannot create 
efficiency for the firm. 
Conclusion 2: From the expression of equilibrium 
strategy, whether I
D
S
P    or
I
D
S
P  
S
, 
the defense strategy of the firm is relevant to the 
parameters , and , ,  , IS DP , ,  
, , , Sc d
 reflect the 
requirements of the firm’s security environment; the 
intrusion strategy of the hacker is relevant to the 
parameters ,and , , ,c d   , ,IS FP IDP    
reflect the characters of the hacker’s intrusion 
Portfolio (ⅱ) deploy all the technologies, i.e. 
Firewall, IDS and Vulnerability scan 
We assume that   fraction of users is external users, 
and only a proportion   of external users are legal 
users. The benefit to the firm under normal use by a 
legal user is  , the other assumptions are the same 
as portfolio (ⅰ), then: 
   (15)  
e
(
)(1 ) (1 )]F FD FP P    
ins access to the system
）=P
)=
- +
P
 
A user
（1 ）（ [(1
 ga
( )
-
=
)(1 ) (1 )] inF FD FP P

    
an internal user
1 =P
）- +
P
 
A user is 
（1 ）（ [(1
     (16) 
eout
( )
-
- + [(1 )(1 ) (1 )]
F
F
F F
D F
P
P P

      
A user is an external legal user
（1 P ） =P
（1 ）（ ）
=
   (17) 
The firm’s expected cost for the alarm and the 
no-alarm  with firewall states respectively are: 
F
AF
F
NF
eoutin (1 )(1 )= +
+ (1 ) + (1 )
II
F FF
A I I I I
D F D F
P PP PF
P P P P
    

 （ ）  (18) 
eoutin 1- (1 )1- (1 )= +
1- - (1 ) 1- - (1 )
II
F FF
N I I I I
D F D F
P PP PF
P P P P
    

 
（ ）（ ）（ ）  (19) 
Then the firm’s expected cost for the alarm AF  and 
the no-alarm NF   states respectively are: 
1 1 1 1 1 1
eoutin
1 1
( , ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 )- +
+ (1 ) + (1 )
A S
II
FF
S I I I I
F c d d
P PP Pd
P P P P
       
   
D F D F
c
   
      
  （ ）
    (20) 
2 2 2 2 2 2
eoutin
2 2
( , ) (1 ) (1 )
1- (1 )1- (1 )- +
1- - (1 ) 1- - (1 )
N S
II
FF
S I I I I
D F D F
F c d d
P PP Pd
P P P P
       
       
      
  
（ ）（ ）（ ）
c
  (21) 
Then the firm’s overall expected cost is: 
1 2 e 1
2
( , , ) [( ( )) ( , )
(1 ( )) ( , )]
I I I
F D F A
I I I
F D F N
F P P P P F
P P P F
     
  
   
   
  (22) 
The hacker’s expected benefit is:  
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( )( (1 ))
I
S D D
IH P            P   (23) 
Proposition 2: The equilibrium when the firm 
implements the firewall, IDS and vulnerability scan 
is identical to the equilibrium in proposition 1. 
Proof: To have the equilibrium point, evaluate 
1 2
0, 0, 0NA FFH  
      
 
Through the observation, there are no 1 2,   in (18) 
and (19), so if derivation, 
i.e.
1 1 2
, NA A
2
NF FF F
   
        , then the 
The 10th International Conference on Electronic Business, Shanghai, December1-December 4  , 2010 
24
Liurong Zhao, Shu-e Mei, Weijun Zhong 
equilibrium in portfolio (ⅰ) is identical to the 
equilibrium in portfolio (ⅱ).   
Conclusion 3: Although the equilibrium in portfolio 
(ⅰ) is identical to the equilibrium in portfolio (ⅱ), 
as , a proper configuration of 
firewall will reduce the firm’s overall expected loss. 
If give the expected firm’s loss, the reduce parts by 
firewall can be used to deploy the other technologies 
or upgrades, which will improve the firm’s 
information security environment. 
0, 0F FA NF F 
Conclusion 4: No matter the portfolio (ⅰ) or (ⅱ), 
Sd  in vulnerability scan does have impact on the 
hacker’s intrusion strategy. The higher Sd , the 
lower the probability of hack’s intrusion, and the 
stronger the system protection is. So the scanner 
should be upgraded its database in time, and set 
scanning period rationally to help the firm reduce the 
probability of hacking. However, it does not mean 
the higher the better. In non-Nash equilibrium, the 
firm’s expected loss is not the minimum loss, i.e. 
repairing all the vulnerabilities is not the best strategy 
for the scanner. It should reasonably repair the 
system vulnerabilities in terms of security level 
requirements. Otherwise the improper repair will 
cause the blue screen of death to the system, which is 
inconvenience to the firm. 
4 conclusions 
Firewall, IDS and vulnerability scan are mainstream 
security technologies. To solve the integrated linkage 
control problem based on attack detection, we 
establish the security model including these three 
technologies. The Nash equilibrium strategy is 
derived by analyzing the security technologies 
selection and optimal configuration. We show that 
deploying all the technologies is not the best choice 
for the firm. Conversely, it will hurt the firm. 
However, reasonable configuration of firewall will 
always reduce the firm’s expected loss. It is 
significant for the optimal configuration of 
information security policy. The technical parameters 
in vulnerability scan do have impact on the hacker’s 
intrusion strategy, but not imply that the more the 
repair the better the system performance. 
We make a tentative research on the information 
security technology portfolios. Future research 
should investigate as follows: (1) Study on the 
interaction between firewall, IDS and vulnerability 
scan, for instance, how does the vulnerabilities in 
scanner impact on the configuration of firewall and 
IDS; (2) Consider a real firm as a research object, 
then the optimal information security strategy is 
proposed by configuring proper technical parameters. 
(3) Solve the optimal configuration problems of the 
other four network security strategies in the 
introduction part. 
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